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Taking Stock of Chapter 11 
 
 





 The past generation will surely be seen as a golden era in American bankruptcy law.   
Prior to the enactment of the Code in 1978, bankruptcy practice was reputed to be a little 
sketchy.1  There were frequent concerns about the influence of bankruptcy “rings” in the major 
cities—groups that treated bankruptcy cases as a source of patronage opportunities that they 
shared among themselves.2  The once glamorous large scale corporate reorganization practice 
had fallen on hard times, dwindling in importance and prestige.3  Law schools responded to these 
reputational issues by disguising the content of their bankruptcy classes with labels like Debtors’ 
and Creditors’ Rights or Commercial Credit I & II.4 
 This all changed after the 1978 Code was enacted.  The Code took aim at concerns about 
bankruptcy rings by, among other things, sharply separating the administrative and judicial 
 
1  DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM page (The Brookings 
Institution) (1971). 
 
2    An influential study of bankruptcy practice in the 1960s (published in 1971) complained that “it is not 
difficult for creditors’ attorneys to arrange elections among themselves,” thus determining who would serve as 
trustee and hire a favored attorney as counsel.  DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, 
PROCESS, REFORM (The Brookings Institution) (1971).   
 
3  Page number needed  
 
4    At the University of Pennsylvania, where I teach, the bankruptcy class was called Commercial Credit II 




functions in a bankruptcy case, and limiting the judge to judicial responsibilities.5  The Code also 
completely reworked the Code’s corporate reorganization provisions, making it much more user 
friendly for businesses in financial distress.6  Within a few years, bankruptcy had an entirely 
different vibe.  Although Chapter 11, the principal focus of this Essay, was vigorously debated in 
the scholarly literature in the early 1990s,7  those doubts, as important as they seemed to law 
professors, never troubled bankruptcy professionals in any serious way.  And in time, even most 
law professors tended to conclude that Chapter 11 worked pretty well.8  Lawmakers in other 
countries have been sufficiently impressed by Chapter 11 that many have incorporated features 
of Chapter 11 into their own insolvency laws.9 
 As his essay for this volume reflects, Sam Gerdano was in the middle of these 
developments almost from the very beginning.10  After an initial exposure to bankruptcy issues 
in the New York attorney general’s office, he worked for Senator Grassley, a key lawmaker on 
the Judiciary Committee, for a number of years before accepting a position as the executive 
director of the American Bankruptcy Institute in 1991.11  Over nearly thirty years, he 
transformed the ABI from a small organization that didn’t have a clear niche, to an essential 
 
5  D.J. Baker et.al., Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: 2012-2014 Final Report and 
Recommendations, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 10 (2014). 
 
6  Baker et.al., supra note 5 
 
7 Baker et.al., supra note 5 (citing several of the articles advocating alternatives to Chapter 11). 
 
8  Baker et.al., supra note 5, at  
 
9  Baker et.al., supra note 5, at 8 n.7 
 
10    Samuel J. Gerdano, An Oral History: Reflections on My 35 Years in Bankruptcy Policy, SYRACUSE L. REV. 
(source and pincite need to be updated once Gerdano article is complete) 
 




partner to the American bankruptcy system, and a key resource for insolvency professionals and 
others.12 
 To put the ABI in context, it is worth comparing it to the other two most important 
bankruptcy organizations.  The oldest, the National Bankruptcy Conference, is an elite group of 
roughly sixty bankruptcy lawyers, judges and professors that serves as a nonprofit lobbying 
organization on behalf of its members’ vision of bankruptcy law.13  The American College of 
Bankruptcy—of which Sam is a member—is an honor society for the profession.14 
 The ABI is the organization for everyone in the bankruptcy profession, and a source of 
information for those outside the profession.15  It remains carefully neutral, and provides 
information for lawmakers, sources for reporters, conferences and panel to discuss ideas, and 
much more.16  One of the signature events in Sam’s tenure was an extensive study of the 
bankruptcy system that produced by far the most important recent study of bankruptcy.17  The 
ABI enlisted numerous bankruptcy professionals, and the report was overseen by a commission 
that limited its recommendations to those that received supermajority support.18 
 
12  Gerdano, supra note 10 
 
13    See About Us, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, http://nbconf.org/history/ (last visited Nov.22, 
2020).The National Bankruptcy Conference has close ties to the Judiciary Committees in the House and Senate, 
which handle bankruptcy issues. 
 
14   See Directory, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, https://www.americancollegeofbankruptcy.com/ (last 
visited Nov.22,2020). 
 
15  See About Us, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (last accessed November 5, 2020) 
https://www.abi.org/about-us.  
 
16    See Gerdano, supra note 10 (noting the neutrality policy). 
 
17    See generally D.J. Baker et al., Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: 2012-2014 Final Report 
and Recommendations, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (2014) (hereinafter, ABI REPORT). 
 





 I first met Sam over two decades ago, and since then have come to expect to see his 
smiling face whenever bankruptcy issues are in the air—not just at ABI events but elsewhere as 
well.  Fifteen years ago, he invited me to serve as scholar in residence for a semester at the ABI.  
It is hard to imagine a more pleasant way to spend a semester.  I took the train down each week, 
spent a few days at ABI headquarters in Alexandria, and immersed myself in ABI activities.  
Suddenly newspaper reporters wanted to talk to me, and I had no trouble persuading bankruptcy 
luminaries to be interviewed for the ABI’s oral history project.  I also saw the enormous 
planning that goes into ABI events, and the efficiency and breadth of the organization. 
 Looking back over Sam’s career, it is as if he took stock in the Bankruptcy Code back in 
the very beginning.  But he didn’t just watch American bankruptcy law flourish.  To the 
contrary, he has done more than almost anyone else to make it flourish and ensure that it 
continues to flourish.  During the current coronavirus crisis, which has led to a substantial 
increase in business bankruptcy filings, the resources and education that the ABI provides, 
thanks to Sam’s leadership, are likely to be more important than ever.19 
 One of Sam’s most remarkable qualities, in my view, is that he rarely seems to try to take 
credit for any of this.  He didn’t give long speeches at the beginning of ABI events or make sure 
his name was splashed all over the written materials.  He quietly went about the business of 
doing what needed to be done.   
 Sam’s retirement is an opportune time to assess where Chapter 11 stands after more than 
four decades with the same basic framework in place.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the assessment I 
 
19    While drafting an essay on the bankruptcy implications of the current crisis, I immediately thought of the 
ABI as the one private organization that could help expand the capacity of the bankruptcy system if needed.  David 
Skeel, Bankruptcy and the Coronavirus, ECONOMIC STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, 11 (April 2020) (“Private 
organizations such as the American Bankruptcy Institute could assist by providing nationwide training for non-




offer in this Essay will quickly take a theoretical turn—I will focus not just on bankruptcy 
practice, but also on the current state of bankruptcy theory—since, as a law professor, that is 
what I do. 
 The standard theory of bankruptcy for the past generation has been the Creditors’ Bargain 
Theory devised by Thomas Jackson, individually and in co-authored work with Douglas Baird.20  
The Creditors’ Bargain Theory explains bankruptcy as a solution to coordination problems that 
might lead to the dismemberment of an otherwise viable firm if creditors were simply left to their 
own devices.21  The role of bankruptcy, according to the theory, is to provide a collective forum 
for resolving these problems and to facilitate an efficient resolution of financial distress.   
When the Creditors’ Bargain Theory was developed, shortly after the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the Code was thought to be a framework of mandatory rules.22  Jackson 
characterized it, and bankruptcy law generally, as solving a bargaining failure by 
implementing—through a “hypothetical bargain”—rules the parties would have agreed to if 
negotiation were possible.23 
 
20    Thomas H. Jackson introduced the Creditors’ Bargain theory in Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, 
and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1982). He and Douglas Baird subsequently developed the 
theory in other articles and a book. E.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON,  THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1986); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 100-01 (1984). Jackson recounts the origins of the Creditors’ Bargain theory in a recent 
essay. Thomas H. Jackson, A Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1867 –
68 (2018). 
 
21  David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1777, 1778 (2018). 
 
22  Id. at 1780. 
 




 The most distinctive feature of current Chapter 11 practice is the extent to which the 
parties now enter into actual contracts governing their rights and responsibilities.24  Intercreditor 
agreements allocate authority between senior and junior lien creditors, restructuring support 
agreements commit the parties to the terms of an expected reorganization plan, and debtor-in-
possession financing agreements dictate the course of many bankruptcy cases.25  Building on a 
recent article with George Triantis, I call these developments the new contract paradigm.26 
 One question raised by the dramatic shift in bankruptcy practice is whether the Creditors’ 
Bargain Theory is now largely irrelevant or even obsolete, as some scholars have suggested.27  It 
is true, as Triantis and I and others have noted, that the particular coordination problem 
foregrounded by Baird and Jackson—the collective action problem faced by widely scattered 
unsecured creditors—no longer characterizes most Chapter 11 cases.28  But this bargaining 
problem has been replaced by other bargaining failures— such as bilateral monopolies between 
the debtor and a key creditor, or between two creditors—to which the same logic applies.29   
I do not mean to suggest the Creditors’ Bargain Theory explains all of bankruptcy.  It 
doesn’t.  The theory provides a much more complete picture of why bankruptcy is necessary, 
than of the optimal framework for resolving financial distress.  This is not surprising, given that 
 
24  Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1779. 
 
25  Id. at 1780. 
 
26    Id. 
 
27  See, e.g., Vincent S.J. Buccola, Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Distress, 114 
NORTHWESTERN U.L. REV. 705, 707 (2019); Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the 
Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709 (2020).  Buccola and Casey take their critiques in 
starkly different directions, with Buccola advocating a minimalist bankruptcy framework and Casey a maximalist 
one. 
 
28    See, e.g. Skeel & Triantis, supra note [21], at 1779-80. 
29    Vince Buccola is the scholar who has focused most directly on the bilateral monopoly issue.  Buccola, 
supra note [27], at 724-25.  
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there does not appear to a single, optimal resolution strategy.  In current practice, the key 
question is how  to make sense of the contracts that now govern the Chapter 11 process.  I argue 
that the principal objective should be to distinguish between ex ante and ex post agreements, and 
to seek to balance the costs and benefits of each.  Perhaps because Chapter 11 is itself designed 
to facilitate an ex post agreement,30 bankruptcy judges have been much more accommodating to 
ex post agreements than to ex ante agreements.   This approach is, in my view, too hostile to ex 
ante contracts and does not provide sufficient scrutiny of ex post agreements. 
 In Part I of the Essay, I develop the theoretical analysis just described.  Along the way, I 
comment on some of the important current bankruptcy contracts, including intercreditor 
agreements and restructuring support agreements.  In Part II, I apply the insights of  Part  I to two 
types of ex post agreement that have become increasingly controversial, DIP financing 
agreements and managerial bonuses.   
I. THE NEW CONTRACT PARADIGM 
 
The most remarkable bankruptcy development of the opening decades of the twenty-first 
century is the pervasiveness of contracts in Chapter 11—some entered into before financial 
distress and some entered into in anticipation of bankruptcy or during the case.31  In this part, I 
identify and assess the contract paradigm that has emerged. To set the stage, I first consider 
whether these developments have rendered the reigning normative theory of bankruptcy—the 
Creditors’ Bargain theory—obsolete.  I then turn to the current contract paradigm itself.   
A) Demise of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory? 
 
 
30  Skeel, & Triantis, supra note [21], at 1781. 
 




For the past generation, the Creditors’ Bargain Theory has been the preeminent 
normative theory of bankruptcy.32  According to this theory, the principal role of corporate 
bankruptcy is to solve a coordination problem.33  If a debtor’s creditors are left to their own 
devices, it is individually rational for each to race to the courthouse, rushing to collect what it is 
owed, even though these collection efforts may lead to the dismemberment of otherwise viable 
firms, thus destroying social value.34  Bankruptcy solves this bargaining failure by creating a 
collective forum for the resolution of financial distress.35  Bankruptcy law should focus on this 
essential goal, according to the Creditors’ Bargain Theory, but should not otherwise alter 
nonbankruptcy law, lest it invite costly squabbles between those that will be better off in 
bankruptcy and those who will do better if the debtor stays out of bankruptcy.36  The deference 
to nonbankruptcy law is sometimes called the Butner Principle—a reference to the Supreme 
Court case it was inspired by.37 
 The Creditors’ Bargain Theory was hotly contested from the beginning, most famously in 
a 1987 debate between Douglas Baird and Elizabeth Warren in the pages of the University of 
 
32  See, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 20 at 7. 
 
33  See, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 20 at 18. 
 
34  THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 20 at 190. 
 
35  See THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 20 at 20. 
 
36    See, e.g., JACKSON,  THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW  21 (1986)  (“[T]he establishment of 
new entitlements in bankruptcy . . . create[s] incentives for particular holders of rights in assets to resort to 
bankruptcy . . . to gain for themselves the advantages of those changes, even when a bankruptcy proceeding would 
not be in the collective interest of the investor group.”). Jackson derived this principle from the Supreme Court 
decision in Butner v. United States: “Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within 
a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall 
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’” 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 
364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). 
 
37   See, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. 




Chicago Law Review.38  After the early 1990s, however, the Creditors Bargain Theory seemed to 
attract less commentary.  This was perhaps due in part to the vagaries of scholarly attention, 
which turned in the 1990s to debates over whether Chapter 11 should be replaced by an 
alternative conception.39  But it also seems to have reflected changes in the capital structure of 
Chapter 11 debtors.  Even the largest frequently were fully encumbered when they entered 
Chapter 11, with little value likely to be available for unsecured claims.40  The particular 
bargaining failure foregrounded by Jackson—the collective action problem faced by scattered 
unsecured creditors—is no longer as common as it once was.  
 One possible conclusion, given the sweeping changes in Chapter 11 practice, might be 
that the time has come to jettison the Creditors’ Bargain Theory.  Some scholars who share the 
law and economics lineage that spawned the Creditors’ Bargain Theory have indeed questioned 
its continuing relevance.41  According to the most aggressive recent critique, which questions 
 
38    See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 777 (1987)(contending that  the purpose 
of bankruptcy law is “to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number 
of different actors”); ,Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
815, 822 (1987)(arguing that “[w]henever we must have a legal rule to distribute losses in bankruptcy, we must also 
have a legal rule that distributes the same loss outside of bankruptcy,” and “that these two rules [should] be the 
same”). 
 
39    See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 311, 323 (1993) (advocating use of “chameleon equity”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu 
Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 68 (1992) (menu approach).  Thomas Jackson also 
had exited the scene, serving at law dean and provost at the University of Virginia, then president at the University 
of Rochester. Our History: Former Faculty: Jackson, Thomas H. (1988-1994), UNIV. OF VA. (October, 22, 2020, 
5:43 PM), https://libguides.law.virginia.edu/faculty/jackson. 
 
40  Even if the firm does have significant unsecured debt, unsecured creditors are less likely to be fragmented 
and dispersed than in the past.  See, e.g., Buccola, supra note [27], at 716-17.  
 
41    See Buccola, supra note [27](arguing that key features of Chapter 11 such as the automatic stay are no 
longer needed due to changes in credit markets); Casey, supra note [27] (rejecting the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
and advocating a focus on ex post holdup issues). Scholars from the progressive tradition exemplified by Elizabeth 
Warren never embraced the Creditors’ Bargain theory. See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: and Empirical Intervention, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1203 (2005). The recent 




whether the theory was ever compelling and aims to kill the giant, “the model of an ex ante 
agreement among creditors [to provide a collective forum for resolving financial distress] proves 
both unnecessary and unhelpful in defining the substance and scope” of bankruptcy.42  Similarly, 
the admonition to honor nonbankruptcy rules unless necessary to achieve a bankruptcy objective, 
as called for by the Butner Principle, “is both circular and wrong.43  It is circular—or at least 
self-contradicting—because it relies on nonbankruptcy entitlements to tell us when the law 
should interfere with nonbankruptcy entitlements.”44  Another scholar does not explicitly reject 
the Creditors’ Bargain theory but suggests its relevance has receded.45  He frames his inquiry as 
asking what features of Chapter 11 remain necessary.46   
 The Creditor’s Bargain Theory unquestionably is an incomplete account of bankruptcy.  I 
will say more about this in a moment.  But first let me explain why the new round of critiques is 
not likely to slay the giant.  One limitation of the recent challenges is that they are often unfair to 
the theory itself.47  It is not altogether accurate, for instance, to say that the Creditors Bargain 
Theory is circular, because “it relies on nonbankruptcy entitlements to tell us when the law 
should interfere with nonbankruptcy entitlements.”48  The Creditors Bargain theory justifies 
 
42    Casey, supra note [27] at 1725. 
 
43  Casey, supra note [27], at 1728. 
 
44   Id.. Juliet Moringiello seems to have been the first recent scholar to point out the ambiguity in the Butner 
Principle.  Juliet Moringiello, When Does Some Federal Interest Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use 
and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 657, 658 (2015).  Versions of this critique also were 
directed at the Creditors’ Bargain Model during the earlier debate.  See, e.g., David Carlson, Philosophy in 
Bankruptcy 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1987) (reviewing JACKSON, supra note [20]) (contending that the details of 
nonbankruptcy law are indeterminate in many respects). 
 
45    Buccola, supra note [27], at 715. 
46  Id. at 720-21. 
47   
 




bankruptcy as providing a collective forum for resolving financial distress, and thus starts with 
the claim that the provisions needed to achieve this objective—such as the automatic stay, a 
preference provision and the rules for executory contracts49—should override any inconsistent 
nonbankruptcy law.50  The Butner Principle is an implication of the theory’s contention that 
bankruptcy should not do more than this—it should not be used to address nonbankruptcy 
problems.   
 Second, the core insight of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory—that a collective forum is 
needed to address the bargaining failures will otherwise occur in the event of financial distress— 
is as compelling a justification for bankruptcy as it was forty years ago.  In current cases, 
coordination problems among scattered unsecured creditors often are not a serious problem, but 
other bargaining failures threaten to prevent an efficient resolution of the debtor’s financial 
distress.  Today’s bargaining failures often are created or exacerbated by the parties’ contracts.  
The complex combination of intercreditor and agreement among lenders provisions in the 
RadioShack case is a vivid illustration.51  The sophisticated parties in that case created what was, 
in effect, a synthetic collective action problem.  In other cases the potential bargaining failures 
are simpler, but also could not be effectively resolved without a bankruptcy forum.52 
 
49    11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2020) (automatic stay); § 547(b) (2020) (preferences); § 365(a) (2020) (executory 
contracts). 
 
50  Buccola, supra note [27], at 706, 711, 712, 721. 
 
51    Salus Capital Partners, LLC v. Std. Wireless Inc. (In re RadioShack Corp.), 550 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2016). RadioShack had two major groups of secured lenders, with an agreement between the two groups and 
separate agreements within each group.  For an overview of the case, see Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, & 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 255, 269-72 (2017). 
 
52  See, e.g., Buccola, supra note [27], at 724-25 (describing bilateral monopolies that can interfere with 
efficient resolution of financial distress and characterizing bankruptcy as “toggling” from property rights to liability 
rules to resolve these potential bargaining failures). 
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It also is telling that features of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory frequently slip back into 
the accounts of its critics.  The vigorous critique cited earlier dismisses the importance of the 
bargaining failures described by the Creditors’ Bargain Theory, yet later states that: “The 
automatic stay is one of bankruptcy’s central provisions.53  It directly addresses the classic 
‘collective action problem.’”54  The critique also implicitly acknowledges bankruptcy is needed 
to assure that these and other bargaining failures do not destroy a distressed firm’s going concern 
value.55  After describing the Butner Principle as “both circular and wrong,” the critique later 
concludes that “a soft version of Butner” should be applied,56 and that “bankruptcy is limited in 
scope and should [only] address bankruptcy matters.”57 
 Perhaps a bankruptcy equivalent of quantum theory will come along and reorient 
everyone’s thinking.  But it strikes me as more likely that the Creditors’ Bargain theory will 
endure. 
B) The Limits of the Theory 
I do not mean to suggest that the Creditors’ Bargain Theory is a complete theory of 
bankruptcy.  It isn’t.  The theory provides a compelling explanation of why business bankruptcy 
is needed and of the importance of protecting non-bankruptcy entitlements except where 
deviation is needed for the purposes of providing a collective forum for resolving financial 
distress.  The theory has much less to say about the details of the resolution process.. 
 
53  Casey, supra note [27], at 1755. 
 
54    Id. 
 
55  Id. at 1734 fn. 108 (focusing on the need to protect “relationship-specific investments” but defining them in 
terms of going concern value). 
56    Id. at 1751. 
 




 One missing piece is liquidity.  The debtor’s operations need to be funded during the 
bankruptcy process, but a distressed firm is likely to face serious obstacles to borrowing, even if 
it has profitable business opportunities, due to debt overhang and asymmetric information 
problems.58  Chapter 11 counteracts this problem, and generates liquidity, in a variety of ways.  
The most obvious is its provision for debtor in possession financing.59  Other sources of liquidity 
include the automatic stay, the treatment of proceeds of collateral, and the provision that permits 
bankruptcy sales.60 
 The theory also provides only limited insight into governance and resolution.61  Any 
bankruptcy framework needs to make choices about how the business will be governed during 
bankruptcy and how its distress is to be resolved.  According to the Creditors Bargain Theory, 
the distress should be resolved the way it would be resolved if there were a single owner of the 
business.62  The single owner perspective is helpful but provides only limited insight how to get 
there.63 
 
58  See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note [37].  Buccola suggests that the Ayotte & Skeel analysis “expanded” the 
Creditors’ Bargain Theory.  Buccola, supra note [27], at 712. 
 
59    11 U.S.C. § 364 (2020).  George Triantis was the first to recognize the importance of this provision as a 
solution to debt overhang.  George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 
Vand L Rev 901, 919–20, 925 (1993). 
 
60    See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note [37] at 1565, 1623; George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the 
Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 66 (2000). 
 
61    I say “limited” rather than “no” insight because Baird and Jackson had more to say about governance and 
resolution than about liquidity.  See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 20 at 100. 
 
62  Casey, supra note [27], at 1731. 
 




 In my view, there are multiple ways that a bankruptcy system can encourage efficient  
governance and resolution by, among other things, reducing potential agency costs.64  The 
approach taken in Chapter 11 begins with the drafters’ decisions to permit the managers of a 
debtor to continue running the business after it files for bankruptcy as debtor in possession,65 and 
to give the managers an “exclusivity period” during which they are the only ones who can file a 
reorganization plan.66  These provisions are in many respects the “secret sauce” of Chapter 11, 
the provisions that distinguished it from any other country’s insolvency rules for many years.67  
Because the debtor’s managers are not immediately displaced at the outset of a bankruptcy case, 
they are less likely to delay filing for bankruptcy.68  The managers are not given free reign in 
bankruptcy, however.  They are subject to extensive oversight, and any actions outside the 
ordinary court of business must be approved by the court after full disclosure and an opportunity 
for other parties to object.69  The other key feature of Chapter 11 is its waivable absolute priority 
 
64  I discuss two very different strategies for achieving these objectives—the more reorganization-oriented 
U.S. approach and an approach that tends toward liquidation if insolvency proceedings are initiated-- at length in 
earlier work. See generally John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure 
and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699 (2002); David 
A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325 
(1998). 
 
65  11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2018). 
 
66   11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2018). 
 
67    For a helpful discussion of the recent adoption of Chapter 11-like bankruptcy rules in many countries, see 
James H.M. Sprayregen, International Insolvency: From Punitive Regimes Toward Rescue Culture, 36 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 7 (2020). 
68  See id. 
 
69  11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2018). 
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rule.70  The overall framework is designed to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor’s 
obligations (and to nudge them in this direction).71  
 One can imagine courts fully protecting these governance choices by prohibiting 
contractual efforts to alter them.  A court might invalidate contracts that have the effect of 
diminishing the debtor’s managers’ flexibility in proposing a reorganization plan.  But that is not 
what bankruptcy judges have done.  For the past several decades, lenders have used debtor-in-
possession financing agreements to, among other things, require that debtors conduct a sale of 
their assets or propose a reorganization plan within a restricted period of time.72  Contractual 
arrangements have also been used to reshape many of the other features of bankruptcy.73   
 The ubiquity of contract in current Chapter 11 raises the questions I will focus on for 
much of the remainder of this Essay: how are the contracts being regulated, and how should they 
be regulated? 
C) The Contours of the New Contract Paradigm 
Contract theory suggests that the best starting point for thinking about the role of contract 
in bankruptcy is to distinguish between ex ante contracts—contracts entered into before the onset 
 
70    The absolute priority rule, which prohibits lower priority creditors or shareholders from receiving a 
recovery unless higher priority creditors will be paid in full, only applies to classes that object to a proposed 
reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018). 
 
71  It also is designed to shift decision-making authority from shareholders to the residual class of creditors.  
David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1557 (2004). 
 
72    Early articles exploring this development include Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of 
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 75 (2002); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate 
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003). 
 
73  See, e.g.,  David A. Skeel, Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, 130 YALE L.J. 366, 371-73 
(2020)(describing how restructuring support agreements and deathtrap provisions alter Chapter 11’s disclosure and 
voting rules). . 
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of financial distress—and agreements that parties reach ex post.74  Each has important costs and 
benefits.  A signal benefit of an ex ante agreement is that, because it allocates risks between the 
parties, it invites each to invest in the relationship.75  If the parties know the contract may later be 
subject to renegotiation, the allocation of risk and their incentive to invest in the relationship may 
be undermined.76  Given the importance of these benefits, the parties sometimes take steps to 
make the contract more difficult to renegotiate.77  The classic scholarly account posits that a 
borrower may wish to borrow from multiple creditors if it wishes to minimize its incentive to 
default and renegotiate the contract.78 
 An important downside of ex ante contracts is that the parties have limited information 
when they enter into the contract, and they are unlikely to be able to fully anticipate all of the 
issues that may arise in the future.79  The parties can hedge to some extent by including flexible 
standards in their agreement, but vague provisions can reduce the benefits of the contract by 
increasing uncertainty and the risk of subsequent litigation.80  Ex post contracts are not subject to 
 
74  The discussion in this section draws on and extends the analysis in Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 
1779. 
 
75  Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1778; see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts 
and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 192–94 (2005) (discussing the tension between 
ex ante and ex post contracting, and the related tension between commitment and flexibility). 
 
76 Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1782. 
 
77  Id. at 1783.  
 
78    Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104 J. POL. 
ECON. 1, 14 (1996). 
 
79    Another important downside is that possibility an ex ante contract can be used to expropriate value from 
third parties.  For discussion of this risk with intercreditor agreements, and a possible response, see Ayotte et al., 
supra note [58], at 263. 
 
80  Id. at 263 (see BOKF, N.A. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re MPM Silicones, LLC), 518 B.R. 740, 751 




these constraints.  Because the future state of the world has already materialized when the parties 
negotiate the terms of an ex post contract, ex post contracting takes place in information rich 
environment.  The parties have much more information than with an ex ante contract. 
 It is tempting to imagine a contract that achieves the benefits of both ex ante and ex post 
contracting.  The parties might negotiate a detailed, fully specified contract ex ante, with the 
expectation that they will later renegotiate the contract to keep it up to date.  But such a contract 
has the downsides of an ex post contract: the prospect of renegotiation would destabilize the 
parties’ allocation of risks and chill the incentive to invest in the relationship.  The tradeoff 
between ex ante and ex post contracts is unavoidable, and needs to be taken into account in 
courts’ handling of contracts in bankruptcy. 
 There is an odd asymmetry in bankruptcy courts’ current scrutiny of ex ante and ex post 
contracts.  Courts seem to be much more sympathetic to the latter than the former.81  The most 
striking illustration is the emerging doctrine with respect to two of the most important contracts 
in many current cases, intercreditor agreements and restructuring support agreements.82  
Bankruptcy judges have subjected intercreditor agreements, which allocate the rights of senior 
and junior secured lenders ex ante, to intense scrutiny.83  Unless a term that a senior lender 
wishes to enforce is “clear beyond peradventure,” courts often refuse to honor it.84  With 
restructuring support agreements, by contrast, courts have been far more welcoming.   
 
81  See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1780.  
 
82     Id. at 1806 (citing In Re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also 
David Skeel, Unwritten Rules and the New Contract Paradigm, 36 Emory BANKR. DEV. J. 739, 743, 747 (2020).  
 
83  See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1810.  
 
84    Id. at 1806. The “clear beyond peradventure” language was coined in In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 




The ex post bias is in many respects understandable.  Chapter 11 itself has a substantial 
ex post bias.  Its voting rules enable the parties to restructure obligations that would be more 
difficult to renegotiate outside of bankruptcy, and the threat of cramdown or liquidation nudges 
the parties toward a consensual restructuring.85  In addition, ex post contracts tend to facilitate a 
restructuring or other resolution of the debtor’s financial distress, whereas ex ante contracts often 
do not; and ex post contracts are negotiated by bankruptcy insiders.86  The bias comes with 
significant costs, however: courts may not fully police the potential problems with ex post 
contracts, and they may undermine the benefits of the parties’ ex post contracts. 
 This does not mean that ex ante contracts always should be enforced as written.  
Intercreditor agreements between senior and junior lenders are a good illustration both of the 
excessive hostility to ex ante agreements and the need for scrutiny.  Bankruptcy courts’ 
insistence that the terms of an intercreditor agreement by “clear beyond peradventure” seems 
problematic.87  But intercreditor agreements can create externalities that harm other creditors and 
undermine the efficiency of the bankruptcy process.88  It is altogether appropriate to police these 
externalities by, for instance, limiting senior creditors to their expectation damages in the event 
of a breach.89 
 
85    See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1799–1800. 
 
86  Id. at 1809–10; see Ayotte et al., supra note [58], at 260 (describing the downsides of intercreditor 
agreements, such as stalling a value-maximizing sale).  
 
87    See, e.g., Ayotte et al., supra note [58], at 262–63 (arguing that courts’ narrow reading may prompt the 
parties to adopt overly broad provisions); see In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 
88  See, e.g., Ayotte et al., supra note [58], at 260–61. 
 




 The much-discussed bankruptcy of General Growth Properties is a much closer call.90  
General Growth Properties, a large network of shopping centers, set up many of the shopping 
centers in bankruptcy remote entities.91  Despite their bankruptcy remote status, GGP filed 
bankruptcy petitions for many of them.92  The bankruptcy court upheld the filings and permitted 
GGP to use the entities to fund the bankruptcy case.93  It is possible that the extraordinary market 
conditions of the 2008-2009 financial crisis justified undoing of the parties’ ex ante 
commitments, but this seems debatable at best.94  The ruling has the potential to undermine the 
benefits of ex ante planning.95 
 Just as my analysis is not a call to wave off scrutiny of ex ante contracts altogether, I also 
do not mean to suggest ex post contracts are invariably problematic.  Restructuring Support 
Agreements (RSA) (or Plan Support Agreements, when they are entered into post-petition) are a 
good illustration.96  An RSA commits its signatories to a reorganization plan that has the features 
specified in the contract, and often includes a signing fee for those who sign.97  In my view, 
 
90    In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 
91  Id. at 47–48. 
 
92    Id. at 54–55. 
 
93    Id. at 69. 
 
94    Professor Ayotte has offered another possible concern with ex ante arrangements of this sort, suggesting 
that they sometimes may reflect inefficiencies arising from the parties’ different views about valuation.  Kenneth 
Ayotte, Disagreement and Capital Structure Complexity, 49 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 14 (2020). 
 
95    For a similar view, see Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, NO EXIT? WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS AND THE 
LAW OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (2013).  For a more robust defense of the 
court’s ex post intervention, see Casey, supra note [27], at 1760. 
 
96    For an extensive analysis of restructuring support agreements and proposed rules of thumb for scrutinizing 
them, see Skeel, supra note [81] (manuscript at passim) (on file with authors). 
 




these fees, like other features of RSAs, should be scrutinized, but they are not invariably 
pernicious.  A signing fees may help counteract strategic holdout behavior, for instance.  
Although bankruptcy courts have sometimes approved problematic RSAs, as in the recent Ad 
Hoc Comm. of Non-Consenting Creditors v. Peabody Energy Corp. case,98 in my view, they 
have properly upheld RSAs with signing fees in others.99 
 Responding to this perspective, several scholars have recently contended that my 
framework for analyzing RSAs is far too permissive.100  “While he ably examines the tension 
between the ‘legal’ aspects of the disclosure and voting process contemplated 
by the statute and the practicalities of bargaining in the current world of financial 
players and financial instruments,” they write in a careful critique, “he fails to appreciate fully 
the importance of these “legal” aspects and is therefore too quick to acquiesce [to provisions that 
alter them].”101  These scholars appear to call for a strong presumption against contractual 
provisions that can be seen as altering the traditional disclosure and voting process in any way, 
and to contend that RSAs with signing fees should be prohibited altogether,102 “even if this puts 
 
98    933 F.3d 918, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 
99    In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013). 
 
100  Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, The Proceduralist Inversion—A Response to Skeel, YALE L.J. 
FORUM 335 (Nov. 24, 2020)[hereinafter, Proceduralist Inversion].  See also Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, 
Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 169, 172–73 (2018) [hereinafter, Badges of Opportunism](arguing for intense scrutiny of RSAs). 
 
101    Janger & Levitin, Proceduralist Inversion, supra note [100], at 338.  One minor quibble with Janger’s and 
Levitin’s characterization of my work in their response: I have never used the term “proceduralist” to describe my 
work, preferring the standard term “law-and-economics.”  I also have called Elizabeth Warren and other critics of 
this perspective “progressives,” not “traditionalists.”  See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A 
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA __ (2001).   
 
102    Janger & Levitin, Proceduralist Inversion, supra note [108], at 346 (noting that “[i]n an earlier article we 
took the position that entitlement-distorting RSAs ought to be proscribed,” and subsequently stating that this 
response is intended “not only to defend our position, but to flesh it out”); Janger & Levitin, Badges of 




ultimate confirmation at risk.”103   If the authors are as hostile to contractual provisions that 
shape the Chapter 11 voting and confirmation process as their call for a pristine process seems to 
suggest, their approach would bar a wide range of potentially beneficial contracts—not just many 
RSAs, but also intercreditor agreements (which often limit second lien creditors’ ability to object 
to a proposed reorganization plan) and other contracts.  In my view, a more nuanced approach is 
far preferable. 
Although they would severely restrict RSAs, these scholars do acknowledge that the risk 
of holdouts is particularly serious in current practice.104  Rather than permitting signing bonuses 
where they serve to discipline potentially problematic holdouts, these scholars would limit the 
voting rights of creditors who buy claims to the amount they paid for the claim, and would also 
limit a creditor’s voting rights to the creditor’s true economic interest in the claims they are 
voting.105  Although their proposals are intriguing, in my view they are a poor fit for the holdout 
problems that signing fees often address.  Creditors who acquire their claims after the onset of 
financial distress are not always the creditors that strategically hold out, for instance.106  The 
reforms also would significantly complicate the voting process,107 undermine the liquidity of the 
 
103  Id. at 344. 
104  See, e.g., Janger & Levitin, Proceduralist Inversion, supra note [108], at 346 (stating that the “injunction to 
look at the structure of the business and the liquidity of the claims trading market [to assess the likelihood of holdout 
behavior] is perhaps Skeel’s most useful insight”). 
105    Id. at 351.  Professors Janger and Levitin first advocated these proposals in an earlier article, Edward J. 
Janger & Adam J. Levitin, ONE DOLLAR, ONE VOTE: MARK-TO-MARKET GOVERNANCE IN BANKRUPTCY, 104 
IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1861 (2019). 
 
106    Skeel, supra note 96, at 10 n.34. 
 
107 See Janger & Levitin, supra note [113], at 1877 (discussing the voting process). The court would need to 
determine the amounts paid by every claim who acquired her claim after distress, and incorporate this into the voting 




claims trading markets,108 and unfairly punish those who acquired the claims.  To the extent the 
prohibition on RSAs with signing fees and other distortive techniques made it more difficult to 
negotiate and confirm a reorganization plan, their hostility to these techniques also could have 
the ironic effect of leading to more section 363 sales, which lack many of the protections 
provided by the Chapter 11 voting process.  
 Another scholar has recently critiqued Triantis’s and my analysis of the new contract 
paradigm from a different perspective, arguing that it gives too much deference to ex ante 
contracts.109  The critique is part of a more general argument that the purpose of bankruptcy is to 
minimize the holdup behavior that might otherwise undermine the ex post renegotiation of a 
debtor’s obligations in the event of financial distress.110  Ex post contracting is given priority 
under this perspective, which advocates “cramdown for everything.”111 
 Although the analysis is fascinating and compelling at times, it has two crucial 
limitations, in my view.112  First, privileging ex post contracts, and treating existing obligations 
 
108 See Janger & Levitin, supra note [113], at 1886. Professors Janger and Levitin would only limit claims 
traders’ voting rights, not their economic rights to a payout.  Id. As a result, the chilling effect on claims trading 
would be less dramatic then it would be if all of their rights were limited, as Janger and Levitin note in their earlier 
article.  Id.  But the chilling effect would not disappear. 
 
109 Casey, supra note [27], at 1751 n. 220 (criticizing our approach as “plac[ing] more trust in ex ante 
contracting than  Chapter 11 does.”) 
  
110 Casey, supra note [27] at 1715. Professor Casey conceptualizes bankruptcy as a response to the inevitable 
incompleteness of contracts made while the debtor is financially healthy. Id.  He suggests that a risk of hold-up 
arises in the event of financial distress as a result of the parties’ relationship specific investments, as conceptualized 
in the contracts literature.  Id. (citing, among other sources, Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and 
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMITRICA 755, 757 (1988)).  But Professor Casey goes on to deploy the term “holdup” 
far more broadly than this, using it as a catch-all that seems to encompass any behavior by a party that deviates from 
the efficient result. Id. at 1717 (stating that “the potential for hold-up arises when parties have made investments that 
involve or link in some way to the going-concern value of the debtor”). 
  
111 Id. at 1753. 
 
112  I also quibble with several of the applications of the analysis, such as its defense of the current treatment of 
executory contracts, despite the well-known distortions caused by section 365, id. at 1757 & note 255 (citing and 
disagreeing with Skeel, The Empty Idea of Equality of Creditors, at 721-22), and its defense of the controversial 
Qualitech case, id. at 1764-65. 
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as expendable, undermines the benefits of ex ante contracting discussed earlier.113  It raises 
uncertainty whether allocations of risk will be honored, and diminishes the parties’ incentives to 
make relationship specific investments.114  It also could increase overall transaction costs, since 
contractual arrangements that would otherwise be settled are reopened for possible 
negotiation.115   
 Second, this bias for ex post renegotiation—“cramdown for everything”—magnifies the 
need for bankruptcy judges to exercise judicial discretion.116  For many years, bankruptcy 
practitioners avoided the use of the cramdown provision for precisely this reason—that it 
required a determination of the value of the firm and as a result put significant discretion in the 
hands of the bankruptcy judge.117  The more contexts in which a cramdown style approach is 
implemented, the more judicial discretion is required.  Chapter 11 works best when judicial 
discretion is cabined rather than magnified, in my view.118 
 Rather than privileging ex post renegotiation, the better approach in my view is to 
balance the costs and benefits of ex ante and ex post contracts.   
 
113 Skeel & Triantis, supra note [21], at 1794. The Chapter 11 confirmation rules themselves provide the 
framework for an ex post contract, as Professor Triantis and I pointed out in the earlier article.  Id. at 1784–85.  But 
courts’ hostility to ex ante contracting goes well beyond the Code itself. Id. at 1785. 
 
114 Id. at 1801. Professor Casey’s approach, which focuses on holdup in relational contexts, could thus 
undermine relational investment. Casey, supra note [27], at 1. 
 
115 Skeel & Triantis, supra note [21], at 1816.  
 
116 See In re LMR, LLC, 496 B.R. 410, 428 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013) (discussing the discretion given to 
judges in determining the cramdown interest methodology). 
 
117 Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 69, 94 (1986). 
 
118  Professor Casey appears to acknowledge this problem, noting that the need for the court “to value the 
relevant assets, claims and outcomes . . . may be the Achilles heel” of this approach. Casey, supra note [27], at 1769. 
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II. Two Trouble Spots 
In the process of identifying and offering a normative defense of the new contract 
paradigm, I briefly considered its implications for a variety of key bankruptcy-related contracts, 
including intercreditor agreements, RSAs, and bankruptcy remote entities.  In this part, I focus in 
somewhat more detail on two additional contractual issues that have provoked increasing 
controversy, the treatment of DIP financers and other senior lenders  and managerial bonuses 
arranged shortly before or during bankruptcy.  Each is one of the first contracts that were used to 
shape Chapter 11 cases roughly twenty-five years ago when the contract paradigm first began to 
emerge.119  I consider them in turn. 
A) DIP Financers and Other Senior Lenders 
The debtor-in-possession financing provision is an extremely generous grant of authority 
to the bankruptcy judge to approve loans to the debtor.120  Debtors generally arrange the 
financing prior to filing for bankruptcy, and ask the bankruptcy judge to approve it immediately 
after the filing, as part of the debtor’s “first day orders.”121  Seventy-five percent of the time, the 
new lender is the same as the debtor’s old lender.122  The DIP financing agreement generally 
 
119  See Skeel, supra note [80], at 923-26 (DIP financing); 926-30 (bonuses and compensation). .  
120  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (2012) (discussing when the court may authorize obtaining credit or 
incurring debt).  As discussed below, the most dramatic power, in section 364(d), is the court’s authority to grant a 
“priming lien” given the DIP financing priority even over earlier liens. Id. 
121  The U.S. Trustee’s Role in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/bankruptcy-fact-sheets/us-trustees-role-chapter-11-bankruptcy-cases (last updated 
Nov. 2, 2020). 
122  Frederick Tung, Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market Conditions, and the Financial 
Crisis, 37 YALE J. REG. 651, 655 n.13 (2020). 
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includes “milestones” that the debtor is required to meet.123  The milestones may contemplate a 
sale of the debtor’s assets or significantly limit the time for filing a reorganization plan.124  The 
DIP financing agreement, together with the lender’s lien on most or all of the debtor’s assets, 
often gives the DIP financer control of the case.125 
 The dominance of secured creditors—especially DIP financers-- has been quite 
controversial for some time.126  Although the complaints often blur together, there are two, 
conceptually different critiques of senior lenders in bankruptcy.  The first is a critique of the 
treatment of senior lenders’ prebankruptcy claims, and applies to all senior lenders, whether are 
not they also are DIP financers.  According to this criticism, the prebankruptcy lender should not 
be entitled to all of the proceeds of a sale or other disposition of the debtor’s assets, even if the 
lender purports to have a “blanket” lien.  These scholars contend that the lender’s ex ante lien 
does not127 or should not encumber all of the value of the debtor.128  The ABI Report adopted a 
 
123  See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale 15 (May 26, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (finding that 86% of DIP financing agreements in 2015-18 sample had milestones). 
124  The DIP financing agreement often is coupled with an RSA.  See, e.g., id. at 2 (describing DIP financing 
and RSA). 
125  Julian S.H. Chung & Gary L. Kaplan, An Overview of Debtor in Possession Financing, THE INT’L 
COMPAR. LEGAL GUIDE TO: LENDING & SECURED FIN. 2020, 120, 121 (July 4, 2020).  
126  An early cri de coeur is Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, 22-7 A.B.I.J. 
12, 12 (2003). 
 
127  Ted Janger has been the strongest proponent of the view that the scope of secured creditors’ lien is limited 
even under existing law.  See Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589.  
128    Anthony Casey argues that secured creditors should only be entitled to the liquidation value of their 
collateral in the first instance, and that unsecured creditors should retain the option value of their claims even after a 
debtor files for bankruptcy.  Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 
11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 765 (2011).  Melissa Jacoby and Ted Janger propose that funds be set aside to 
compensate unsecured claims in the event a bankruptcy sale later appeared to have garnered too low a price.  
Melissa B. Jacoby and Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 




version of these proposals, calling for unsecured creditors to receive the option value of their 
claims in either an asset sale or a traditional reorganization.129 
 The second criticism, by contrast, is a concern about ex post contracts—the DIP 
financing agreements a debtor enters into after having fallen into financial distress.  Evidence has 
recently emerged that DIP financers earn supra-competitive profits from DIP loans.130  One 
study measured the profits directly, and concluded that DIP lenders’ supra-competitive profits 
have not declined through time.131   The second found that the pricing of DIP loans is 
comparable to junk bonds, despite the much lower default rate on DIP loans.132  The most likely 
explanation for persistently supra-competitive profits is the advantage a debtor’s existing lenders 
have over other potential sources of funding.133  The debtor’s prebankruptcy lenders have much 
more information about the debtor than other lenders, and are often well positioned to quickly 
provide the operating funds the debtor needs.134  As noted earlier, 75% of debtors that obtain DIP 
financing get the financing from inside lenders.135  In response to this evidence, some scholars 
have suggested that courts or lawmakers should intervene in the DIP financing market. 
 
129    See ABI REPORT, supra note 17, at 207–11. 
 
130  See B. Espo Eckbo et al., Rent extraction by super-priority lenders 1 (Mar 13, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Tuck School of Business); see also Tung, supra note 120, at 653. 
 
131    Eckbo et al, supra note 127, at 11, 37. 
 
132  Tung, supra note 120, at 686–87. 
 
133  Eckbo, supra note 127, at 3–4. 
 
134  Id. at 27. 
 




 The analysis of ex ante and ex post incentives in the last part suggests that the policy 
recommendations emanating from the first critique—the calls to limit senior creditors’ liens— 
would be a mistake.  If senior lenders have a lien on all of the debtor’s assets, the should be 
treated as having priority with respect to all of the value.136  Artificially limiting the scope of a 
lender’s security interest would undermine the ex ante benefits of collateralized lending..137    
 The second critique—which focuses on ex post contracts-- is more serious.  The 
persistence of supra-competitive profits suggests the market for DIP financing may not be 
working efficiently.  A variety of harms may flow from this. The most obvious is that debtors 
will be forced to pay more for DIP financing than they would in a competitive market.138  DIP 
lenders also may use their leverage to insist on benefits that improve their position at the expense 
of other creditors.139  Finally, the DIP lender could use its leverage to dictate an outcome that 
benefits the DIP lender but diminishes the overall value of the firm.140  Rather than allow the 
debtor to pursue a traditional reorganization, for instance, the DIP lender may condition its loan 
on a prompt sale of the debtor’s assets, even if reorganization would be more efficient.141   
 
136   For a similar conclusion, see Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors After Res Cap, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 849, 857-58 (“As long as a creditor has a senior security interest in everything at the moment the 
petition was filed, any increase in value during the bankruptcy belongs to this creditor.”). 
137  For a similar argument, see Barry E. Adler & George Triantis, Debt Priority and Options in Bankruptcy: A 
Policy Intervention, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 591 (2017)(criticizing the ABI proposal). 
 
138  Tung, supra note 120, at 687. 
 
139    Id. at 654. One common strategy—known as a “roll-up”—is to insist that the debtor pay off the earlier loan 
with proceeds of the DIP loan, which ensures that the earlier loan is paid in full even if it was not actually fully 
collateralized.  The DIP financer may also ask the debtor to waive causes of action the debtor may have against the 
DIP financer.  Id. at 667–68. 
 
140  Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 511, 514 (2009).  
 




 It is important to recognize that DIP lender control can also be beneficial.  Before lenders 
began using DIP financing agreements as a governance lever, the debtor’s managers often had 
too much flexibility, and cases sometimes dragged on for considerable periods of time.142  
Neither problem is nearly as prevalent today.143 
 Bankruptcy judges face a difficult predicament when they scrutinize proposed DIP 
lending agreements.  The debtor and the inside lender often warn that, unless the court approves 
the loan, the business will collapse in short order.144  In theory, bankruptcy judges could 
scrutinize the terms of the loan contract, and forbid those that seem problematic.  To some 
extent, they already do this by requiring clear identification of potentially problematic DIP loan 
provisions.145  But it is unrealistic to expect judges to micromanage the contracts. 
One strategy that might help is to signal a willingness to grant a priming lien to a non-
insider that offers to make a loan.146  Courts have been very reluctant to authorize a priming lien 
for a non-insider lender unless the earlier lender consents.147  Yet the Code explicitly authorizes 
courts to approve priming liens so long as the prior lender’s loan is adequately protected.148   
 
142  Fotenini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned Cases, and Refiling Rates: An Empirical Analysis in 
the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 580–81 (2015). 
 
143   Id. at 593 (finding that the mean duration for traditional Chapter 11 cases dropped from 634 to 430 days 
after 2005, and the mean for all cases (including prepackaged bankruptcies) fell from 480 to 261 days). 
 
144  Tung, supra note 120 at 665. 
 
145   The bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of New York have guidelines requiring proponents of 
debtor-in-possession loans to explicitly flag, among other things, any provision using new collateral to collateralize 
pre-petition obligations. See S.D.N.Y. USBC. LAB. Rule 4001–2(a)(6) (2017). 
 
146    Professors Ayotte and Ellias advocate a more aggressive approach, advocating that courts provide a two-
three month period for a priming loan at the beginning of the case.  Ayotte & Ellias, supra note [132].. 
 
147  Tung, supra note 120 at 658 n. 25. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (d)(1)(B) (2018). 
 




Notice that adopting a more flexible stance toward priming liens would not require any 
legislative reform.  If bankruptcy judges simply signaled a willingness to grant priming liens, and 
did in fact grant them in appropriate cases, the market might quickly become more competitive.  
In another work, a co-author and I advocate that banking regulators facilitate DIP lending by 
ordinary banks to medium-sized firms, which currently have little access to DIP loans.149  These 
steps seem more promising than a more dramatic intrusion into the market. 
B) Managerial Bonuses 
The other early ex post contractual strategy for shaping managers’ behavior was the use 
of performance bonuses.150  These bonuses might promise the managers a bigger payout if a 
reorganization plan was confirmed within a specified period of time, or the payout might be 
linked to the value of the debtor’s assets at confirmation.  More recently, companies have 
increasingly begun paying bonuses to their executives before filing for bankruptcy rather than 
after, a trend that is quite controversial.151  “Such bonuses have long spurred objections,” as one 
story put it, “that companies are enriching executives while cutting jobs, stiffing creditors and 
wiping out stock investors.”152 
 Ironically, the rush to award bonuses prior to bankruptcy seems to have been prompted 
by changes made to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, after scandals involving Enron, WorldCom 
 
149   See Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel, Using the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window for Debtor-in-
Possession Financing During the COVID-19 Bankruptcy Crisis, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (July 2020) at 2. 
 
150    See Skeel , supra note [80], at 926-30. 
 
151  Mike Spector & Jessica DiNapoli, On eve of bankruptcy, U.S. firms shower execs with bonuses, REUTERS 
(July 17, 2020, 7:05 A.M.) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-bankruptcy-bonuses/on-eve-of-
bankruptcy-u-s-firms-shower-execs-with-bonuses-idUSKCN24I1EE. 
 




and other companies prompted amendments designed to discourage bonuses in bankruptcy.153  
The 2005 amendments essentially ban post petition pay-to-stay bonuses, forbidding them unless, 
among other things, the executive has a bona fide offer from another employer at the same or 
greater compensation.154  Because the prohibition only applies to stay bonuses, debtors can 
evade it by making sure the bonuses have performance-based features.  But the changes seem to 
have prompted frequent challenges to the bonus plans.155   
The new prebankruptcy bonuses are not immune from attack altogether.  They can be 
challenged as fraudulent conveyances—based on the argument that the company received 
insufficient consideration in return for the payout.156  But the debtor is not likely to challenge the 
bonuses, since its managers or directors are the ones who authorized the bonuses in the first 
place; thus, the creditors’ committee would need to obtain court approval to challenge the 
bonus.157  In many cases, the bonuses are never formally challenged, and in the end any claims 
against the executives are released as part of the Chapter 11 reorganization plan.158 
 
153  See Baker et al, supra note 17, at 313.. 
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BAPCA.  Jared Ellias, Regulating Bankruptcy Bonuses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 654, 664–65 (2019). 
 
156  See id. at 660 (citing James Sprayregen et al., Recent Lessons on Management Compensations at Various 
Stages of the Chapter 11 Process, Financier Worldwide (Mar. 2013), https://www.financierworldwide.com/recent-
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A proposal to ban all post-petition bonuses was recently introduced in Congress.159  The 
proposed legislation would prohibit a debtor from paying bonuses to any employee making more 
than $250,000 a year, and covers bonuses of all kinds, defining “bonus” to include any 
compensation that “can be construed as a form of retention, incentive, or reward related to the 
services provided to the debtor.”160 
Awarding bonuses to managers after a company has fallen into financial distress is 
analogous to resetting executives’ stock options after a decline in the firm’s stock price.  From an 
efficiency perspective, the problem with an option reset is that it undermines executives’ ex ante 
incentives—suggesting they will be given another opportunity to benefit even if the firm 
performs poorly.161  But the reset also can improve the executives’ ex post incentives by, for 
instance, linking the bonus to performance milestones.162  The challenge, as always, is to 
approximate the optimal balance between ex ante and ex post incentives.163 
The same logic suggests that a complete ban on bonuses would be a mistake, given the 
possibility they will improve managers’ incentives in bankruptcy.  To be sure, this by itself does 
not mean proposals to preclude post-petition bonuses are problematic.  If bonuses are best 
arranged prior to bankruptcy rather than during the bankruptcy case, perhaps such a ban could be 
justified.  But precisely the opposite is true.164  The risk of self-dealing is much more severe if 
the bonus is given prior to bankruptcy.  Arranging bonuses post-petition ensures more 
 
159  No Bonuses in Bankruptcy Act of 2019, H.R. 1557, 116th Cong. (2019) 
 
160  Id. at section 2 (proposed for codification at section 503(d)(2)(B)). 
161    See, e.g. Viral V. Acharya et al., On the Optimality of Resetting Stock Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 63 
(2000). 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Even if pre-bankruptcy bonus awards were preferable, the proposed legislation would effectively bar 
performance-based bonuses entered into before bankruptcy, since the performance would occur during the 
bankruptcy case and the legislation bars any bonus payment during the case.  Only pre-bankruptcy stay bonuses that 
were paid prior to filing would escape the ban. 
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transparency, given the requirement of notice and a hearing as a prerequisite for approval.165  
Moreover, prebankruptcy bonuses can be used to help cement the control of inside lenders.  Pre-
bankruptcy bonuses should therefore be viewed with more skepticism than post-petition bonuses, 
not less.   
These considerations not only weigh against adopting a ban on bankruptcy bonuses; they also 
suggest that the current restrictions on post-petition bonuses should be rolled back, given the 
evidence that the existing restrictions on post-petition stay bonuses have spurred more challenges 
to performance-based bonuses.  Either approach—the current rule or a rule that removed the 
2005 restriction on stay bonuses—requires a bankruptcy judge to police the bargain with 
imperfect information, as with other ex post contracts.166   This may counsel in favor of adopting 
rules of thumb, such as a presumption against ever permitting pre-bankruptcy bonuses and closer 
scrutiny of stay bonuses than true performance bonuses that are proposed after the debtor files 
for bankruptcy. Courts employ a similar strategy in corporate law.  In determining whether to 
enforce lockup or breakup fee provisions that promise compensation to a bidder if the bidder’s 
acquisition of a target company is not successful, for instance, courts have developed rough 
guidelines for permissible provisions, while striking down lockups that are clearly excessive.167 
Conclusion 
 Although the statutory framework of Chapter 11 has not changed dramatically for more 
than forty years now—the interval at which major reforms had previously arrived over the past 
 
165   11 U.S.C. 363(b)(requiring court approval of transactions out of the ordinary course of business). 
166    For a similar point, see Barry Adler & George G. Triantis, The Aftermath of North LaSalle Street, 70 U. 
CINN. L. REV. 1225, 1237 (2002)(concluding that judges are not well-positioned to balance the ex ante and ex post 
incentives). 
167    Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp, 695 A.2d 43, 49–50 (Del. 1997) is the leading case on breakup fees, 
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century168—bankruptcy practice has.  I have referred to the regime that has emerged as 
bankruptcy’s new contract paradigm.  I have argued that the key focus of oversight should be 
trading off the benefits and costs of ex ante and ex post contracts, and have advocated that 
bankruptcy judges give a little less deference to ex post contracts, and a little more to ex ante 
arrangements. 
 Just as bankruptcy practice is dynamic, judicial oversight of bankruptcy-relevant 
contracts also needs to be dynamic.  Twenty-five years ago, some of the contracts that are most 
central to current Chapter 11 practice, such as intercreditor agreements and RSAs, were 
uncommon.  Other contracts, such as DIP financing agreements have evolved in ways that are 
more problematic than they were in earlier periods. 
 The Bankruptcy Code has had a splendid run, and it has proven more adaptable than 
anyone imagined four decades ago.  Sam Gerdano has been there pretty much from the 
beginning, and his fingerprints are everywhere present in American bankruptcy law, in ways 
both visible and invisible.  It has been a privilege to watch him in action, and it is a privilege to 
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